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HIGH SEAS AND HIGH RISKS:
PROLIFERATION IN A POST-9/11 WORLD
David G. Hodges∗

I. INTRODUCTION
One of the biggest threats that the world faces is the proliferation of
weapons of mass destruction (“WMD”) and their use by rogue states and
terrorist groups.1 As the September 11, 2001 terrorist attacks proved,
within the span of a few hours, thousands of people can be killed and the
direction of the world can be radically changed through the use of
unconventional weapons and tactics.2 As terrible as the attacks were,
however, the carnage and consequences of that day would have seemed
like a mere pittance if certain kinds of WMD were used instead.3
Ever since chemical weapons were used to devastating effect in
World War I, nations began employing different tactics to control WMD,
including legal, political, diplomatic, and military strategies.4 One of the
∗ David G. Hodges is an attorney at CN Communications, a firm in New York City,
New York. This Article is dedicated to Alexander and Françoise Gilbert, who made their
own journey across the sea.
1. See Michael A. Becker, The Shifting Public Order of the Oceans: Freedom of
Navigation and the Interdiction of Ships at Sea, 46 HARV. INT’L L.J. 131, 136 (2005)
(arguing that the use of a WMD “undoubtedly” threatens world peace and security).
2. See Andrew C. Winner, The Proliferation Security Initiative: The New Face of
Interdiction, THE WASH. QUARTERLY, Spring 2005, 140 (arguing that the attacks
reenergized existing efforts to fight WMD proliferation).
3. See William Langewiesche, How to Get a Nuclear Bomb, ATLANTIC MONTHLY,
Dec. 2006, available at http://www.theatlantic.com/magazine/archive/2006/12/how-toget-a-nuclear-bomb/305402/ (last visited Jan. 29, 2014) (noting that in the first nuclear
bomb used in the Second World War, “the explosion over Hiroshima yielded a force
equivalent to 15,000 tons (fifteen kilotons) of TNT, achieved temperatures higher than
the sun’s, and emitted light-speed pulses of dangerous radiation. More than 150,000
people died.”).
4. See Kevin J. Fitzgerald, The Chemical Weapons Convention: Inadequate
Protection from Chemical Warfare, 20 SUFFOLK TRANSNAT’L L. REV. 425, 430 (Summer
1997) (explaining that the 1.3 million casualties of chemical weapons in the First World
War led to the outlawing of chemical and biological weapons in war with the Geneva
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latest efforts is the Proliferation Security Initiative (“PSI”), a multilateral
agreement with more than one hundred nations to facilitate interdictions
of vessels suspected of carrying WMD5 (a weapon made of nuclear,
chemical, or biological materials).6 Created by the Bush Administration
and continued by President Barack Obama, the PSI is both a part of, and
separate from, the existing anti-proliferation framework7—a fact that
makes it somewhat controversial, especially when its participants assert
its most far-reaching powers on the high seas.8
According to longstanding international maritime law, the seas do
not belong to any nation and, absent a claim of universal jurisdiction or
some other exception, it is illegal to board another ship.9 For many
years, universal jurisdiction could only be exercised to thwart a limited
number of offenses, none of which are closely related to WMD
proliferation.10 In response to September 11, however, some states
pushed to broaden international maritime law to allow states to board

Protocol for the Prohibition of the Use in War of Asphyxiating, Poisonous, or Other
Gases, and of Bacteriological Methods of Warfare).
5. Andrew S. Williams, The Interception of Civil Aircraft Over the High Seas in the
War on Terror, 59 A.F. L. REV. 73, 87 (2007) (explaining that organizing state
cooperation to stop the proliferation of WMD and its component parts is the goal of the
PSI).
6. See Daniel H. Joyner, The Proliferation Security Initiative: Nonproliferation,
Counterproliferation, and International Law, 30 YALE J. INT’L L. 507, 511 (2005).
7. See generally Craig H. Allen, A Primer on the Nonproliferation Regime for
Maritime Security Operations Forces, 54 NAVAL L. REV. 51, 54-56 (2007) (explaining
that nonproliferation “generally refers to the international and national regimes that seek
to halt and eventually reverse the proliferation of WMD and their delivery systems,”
whereas counter-proliferation “generally refers to the more muscular efforts to prevent
the movement of WMD materials, technology and expertise from states that fail to
conform to nonproliferation norms to hostile states and terrorist organizations.” For the
purposes of this Article, the Author combines nonproliferation and counter-proliferation
into “anti-proliferation” to save space and avoid the technicalities attendant to discussing
the different regimes.); see also Press Release, President Barack Obama, Presidential
Statement on 10th Anniversary of the Proliferation Security Initiative (May 15, 2013),
available at http://www.state.gov/documents/organization/210348.pdf.
8. John Yoo & Glenn Sulmasy, The Proliferation Security Initiative: A Model for
International Cooperation, 35 HOFSTRA L. REV. 405, 414 (2006) (explaining that some
critics regard it as a facilitator of conflict and a danger to freedom of navigation).
9. See Ian Patrick Barry, The Right of Visit, Search and Seizure of Foreign Flagged
Vessels on the High Seas Pursuant to Customary International Law: A Defense of the
Proliferation Security Initiative, 33 HOFSTRA L. REV. 299, 306 (2004) (explaining that the
principle of the freedom of the open seas took four centuries to develop).
10. See Becker, supra note 1, at 204 (explaining that each universal jurisdiction
offense has its own history and policy reasons).
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vessels to stop WMD proliferation.11 The PSI is at the forefront of this
expansionary effort.12
This Article considers whether the PSI can be used to expand
universal jurisdiction to stop WMD proliferation and, if so, whether such
an expansion is desirable. Part II provides background information on
the PSI and past conventions, treaties, and multilateral efforts to stem
proliferation and delineate maritime jurisdiction. Part III analyzes the
ways in which the PSI and its supporting texts affect universal
jurisdiction. Part IV offers three recommendations. First, Part IV(A)
recommends that universal jurisdiction should expand under the aegis of
the United Nations. Second, Part IV(B) argues that if it cannot expand
under the United Nations, then universal jurisdiction should expand by
increasing the number of states that belong to the PSI. Third, Part IV(C)
proposes that if it cannot expand under the United Nations or by
increasing the amount of PSI members, then universal jurisdiction should
expand through unilateral interdictions. Lastly, Part V of this Article
advocates that universal jurisdiction on the high seas should be expanded
to include WMD interdiction.
II. BACKGROUND
In May 2003, the PSI was introduced to close loopholes in
international law and better facilitate the interdiction of WMD, their
precursors, and related materials.13 The problem with the existing
framework was illustrated in December 2002, when Spanish naval forces
on the high seas intercepted the So San, a North Korean ship bound for
Yemen.14 After searching the ship’s hull, such forces found SCUD

11. Yoo & Sulmasy, supra note 8, at 409 (arguing that prior to the creation of the PSI
that the “well established U.S. commitment to freedom of navigation on the high seas
was at odds with its goal of preventing the proliferation, sale and transport of WMD”).
12. See id. (explaining that the impetus for the PSI came after frustration with the
United Nations due to past ineffectiveness and its institutional aversion to dealing with
non-state problems).
13. The Proliferation Security Initiative (PSI), U.S. DEP’T OF STATE (May 26, 2005),
http://2001-2009.state.gov/t/isn/rls/other/46858.htm (explaining that the “goal of [the]
PSI is to create a more dynamic, creative, and proactive approach to preventing
proliferation to or from nation states and non-state actors of proliferation concern”).
14. See Joby Warrick, On North Korean Freighter, a Hidden Missile Factory, WASH.
POST, Aug. 14, 2003, at A1 (noting that the Spanish forces first fired warning shots after
the ship tried to flee and then destroyed the ship’s mast cables so that the forces could
board).
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missiles, which are capable of transporting WMD.15 However, although
the Spanish forces had authority under international law to board the ship
because it did not display its flag, the naval forces did not have the legal
authority to seize the missiles or any WMD-related components.16
The So San incident exposed a problem: How can responsible states
legally stop the transportation and proliferation of WMD and missiles?17
Under existing international law, there were a number of treaties,
resolutions, and agreements that dealt with proliferation, but there was no
overarching enforcement regime that pulled all of them together.18 In
response, the United States and an initial group of eleven other countries
determined to make such a seizure legal so that an incident like the So
San would not happen again.19
In order to prevent another So San, the PSI framers took the existing
legal authorities and used them to create a new framework, one that was
both multilateral and voluntary in nature.20 Whereas past authorities and
their enforcement mechanisms, like the Non-Proliferation Treaty
(“NPT”) and the International Atomic Energy Agency (“IAEA”), are
essentially bureaucratic and closely tied to the United Nations, the PSI is
more operational and technically outside the existing framework, even as
it is also in accord with it.21 Termed “an activity, not an organization” by

15. Joyner, supra note 6, at 508 (noting that after calling in American military
explosives experts, the interdiction revealed that the ship held parts of fifteen SCUD
missiles, fifteen warheads, and eighty-five drums filled with a chemical used in SCUD
missile fuel).
16. Becker, supra note 1, at 153 (noting that nothing in international law made the
transport by sea of ballistic missiles or WMD-related materials illegal).
17. See Yoo & Sulmasy, supra note 8, at 408 (explaining that the boarding was likely
legal, but that any seizure would be illegal); but see JOHN BOLTON, SURRENDER IS NOT AN
OPTION, 120-1 (2007) (arguing that seizing the cargo would have been legal because the
ship was illegally traveling as a commercial vessel, but that someone decided to permit
the ship to continue its journey due to Yemen’s cooperation in the war on terror).
18. See Yoo & Sulmasy, supra note 8, at 409 (arguing that the gap that the PSI sought
to fill permitted WMD proliferation and thus posed a threat to peace and security).
19. Becker, supra note 1, at 149 (noting that the original PSI core consisted of
Australia, France, Germany, Italy, Japan, The Netherlands, Poland, Portugal, Spain,
United Kingdom, and the United States).
20. Proliferation Security Initiative Frequently Asked Questions (FAQ), U.S. DEP’T OF
STATE (May 22, 2008), http://2001-2009.state.gov/t/isn/rls/fs/105213.htm (last visited
Apr. 13, 2014) (explaining that the PSI does not replace existing anti-proliferation tools,
but complements them by closing their loopholes).
21. See Yoo & Sulmasy, supra note 8, at 410 (arguing that the PSI is built upon the
political commitment of nations to fight proliferation, which is manifested in bilateral and
multilateral agreements, as well as by respecting customary international maritime law).
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one of its supporters,22 the PSI takes its inspiration from international
law, existing nonproliferation treaties, counter-proliferation agreements,
and the Law of the Sea Convention (“UNCLOS”).23 In the words of
former United States National Security Advisor, Stephen J. Hadley:
[The] PSI is not a replacement for the NPT, the IAEA, or the
multilateral export control regimes—but a way to build upon
them and give them a new enforcement mechanism they did not
have before. In the PSI, cops and criminals do not co-exist in the
organization. [It] is a group of nations committed to be cops… a
group that defines criminals clearly… and a group committed to
hold themselves and each other accountable for results.24
Today, even “[t]hough the PSI is now a key part of . . . global nonproliferation efforts,” its members “must [continue to] commit to
concrete, tangible actions to strengthen the PSI and sustain it as a core
element of the non-proliferation regime.”25In order to become a member
of the PSI, a state must follow four interdiction principles, and
subsequently enforce them through national laws.26 These PSI members
pledge to give each other the right to search and seize other members’
suspect ships, to search suspect vessels that enter their ports and, of
course, not to trade in WMD.27 The PSI is not part of any particular
22. John R. Bolton, War, International Law, and Sovereignty: Reevaluating the Rules
of the Game in a New Century, 5 CHI. J. INT’L L. 395, 399 (2005) (arguing that the
“activity” characterization explains the PSI’s success); see also Becker, supra note 1, at
148 (explaining that some supporters define it against existing efforts, characterized as
“bloated, top-heavy international organization[s], whose decision-making capabilities or
capacity to act are paralyzed by centralization and internal dissent”).
23. See Joyner, supra note 6, at 512-17, 525-35.
24. Stephen J. Hadley, Former U.S. Nat’l Sec. Advisor, Remarks at the Proliferation
Security Initiative Fifth Anniversary Senior Level Meeting (May 28, 2008), available at
http://georgewbush-whitehouse.archives.gov/news/releases/2008/05/20080528-3.html.
25. Press Release, President Barack Obama, supra note 7.
26. Proliferation Security Initiative: Statement of Interdiction Principles, U.S. DEP’T
OF STATE, http://www.state.gov/t/isn/c27726.htm (last visited Feb. 2, 2014) (providing
the PSI’s four main interdiction principles: (1) to “undertake effective measures, either
alone or in concert with other states, for interdicting the transfer or transport of WMD,
their delivery systems, and related materials; (2) to adopt “streamlined procedures for
rapid exchange of relevant information”; (3) to review and strengthen both national and
international authorities to achieve PSI objectives; and (4) to take specific actions to
interdict WMD, their delivery systems and related materials).
27. Michael Byers, Policing the High Seas: The Proliferation Security Initiative, 98
AM. J. INT’L. L. 526, 529 (2004) (explaining that the PSI is not just a paper agreement,
but an effective enforcement mechanism, both through its training exercises and actual
interdictions).

194

OCEAN AND COASTAL LAW JOURNAL

[Vol. 19:2

international law, treaty, or organization, but functions with such existing
laws to “try[] to interdict WMD materials.”28 Accordingly, it is an
enforcement mechanism that functions mostly independent of the nonproliferation regime.29
The legal basis for the PSI comes from a multitude of sources,
including some that were installed subsequent to its enactment, such as
United Nations Security Council Resolution 1540.30 Its “authority”
derives primarily from the NPT, the Chemical and Biological Weapons
These legal
conventions, UNCLOS, and the United Nations.31
authorities are, in turn, bolstered by multilateral export control
agreements, including the Nuclear Suppliers Group (“NSG”) and
Australia Group.32 To illustrate how these sources interact and the legal
underpinnings of the PSI, the following is a brief survey of the
authorities that underlie the PSI and the authorities that have affirmed it
since its creation.
A. The Law of the Sea Convention
Although UNCLOS is not an anti-proliferation treaty, it is crucial to
the legality of the PSI because it is one of the most widely accepted
pieces of international law.33 Its authority derives from its codification
of longstanding maritime law, which existed in one form or another

28. Kyle Mathis, The Nuclear Supplier Group: Problems and Solutions, 4 ALA. C.R.
& C.L. L. REV. 169, 181 (2013); see also Proliferation Security Initiative Frequently
Asked Questions (FAQ), U.S. DEP’T OF STATE, http://2001-2009.state.gov/t/isn/rls/fs/
46839.htm (last visited Feb. 1, 2014) (explaining that the PSI strives to be consistent with
national legal authorities).
29. Becker, supra note 1, at 149 (noting that PSI members need not sign a formal
agreement or assume legally binding obligations).
30. See U.N. SCOR, 63rd Sess., 4956th mtg. at 1, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1540 (Apr. 28,
2004); see also S.C. Res. 1673, ¶ 1 U.N. Doc. S/RES/1673 (Apr. 27, 2006) (explaining
the origins and effect of 1540).
31. Joyner, supra note 6, at 512-17, 525-35 (discussing the PSI’s sources and
influences).
32. David S. Jonas, The New U.S. Approach to the Fissile Material Cutoff Treaty:
Will Deletion of a Verification Regime Provide a Way out of the Wilderness?, 18 FLA. J.
INT’L L. 597, 645 (2006) (arguing that such efforts are “relative success[es]” in
preventing WMD-related exports).
33. William D. Baumgartner, UNCLOS Needed for America’s Security, 12 TEX. REV.
L. & POL. 445, 450-51 (2007-2008) (arguing that by formally acceding to UNCLOS, the
United States will make the PSI even more powerful due to UNCLOS’s widespread
acceptance throughout the world).
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dating back to the medieval period.34 However, despite its widespread
adherence, some nations, such as the United States, regard it as
customary international law, making its effect somewhat weaker than it
would be if the United States were a party.35 A customary law, as
opposed to a treaty or convention, is a “general and consistent practice of
states followed by them from a sense of legal obligation.”36 UNCLOS,
which was signed in 1982, was ratified by 157 nations.37
The backbone of maritime law is the idea that no nation owns the
seas, even though a nation may claim some amount of jurisdiction from
its coastline to the sea.38 Moreover, because the power of the state is at
its zenith in its own territory, the closer a vessel is to a state the more
power the state has to assert over the vessel.39 To that end, there are four
classifications of a state’s jurisdiction under UNCLOS.40 First, the
34. Joyner, supra note 6, at 526 (“The evolution of [the law of the sea] has continued
through to modern times, and in the twentieth century it has [been] codified . . . in a
number of significant multilateral treaties as well as through the rule-generating
processes of customary international law.”).
35. Baumgartner, supra note 33, at 449-51 (arguing that acceding to a treaty is better
than customary law because it makes interpretation much easier by clearly delineating the
terms of the agreement rather than leaving them subject to interpretation).
36. THOMAS BUERGENTHAL & SEAN D. MURPHY, PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAW IN A
NUTSHELL 21 (West Publishing Co. 2002) (1985) (quoting RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE
FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES § 102(2) (1987)) (explaining that a law
becomes customary both out of widespread adherence and the fact that states regard it as
obligatory).
37. Joyner, supra note 6, at 526-27 (explaining that the main reason why the United
States has refused to sign UNCLOS—its regulation of the deep sea bed—is unrelated to
the parts of UNCLOS that are relevant to the PSI).
38. Barry, supra note 9, at 307 (commenting that the hugely influential Dutch jurist,
Hugo Grotius, formulated the idea that because the sea belongs to every state, no state
can claim it as that state’s exclusive property); see also Williams, supra note 5, at 94
(providing that this “paramount” principle ensures the mobility of United States forces in
times of war and peace).
39. Jonathan C. Thomas, Spatialis Liberum, 7 FLA. COASTAL L. REV. 579, 604 (20052006) (explaining that a state’s power decreases as the distance from the state’s coastline
increases).
40. See Proliferation Security Initiative: Statement of Interdiction Principles, supra
note 26 (Section 4(d) of the PSI, which parallels UNCLOS’s classification of the
territorial and contiguous seas, allows PSI members to take “appropriate actions” to: (1)
“stop and/or search in their internal waters, territorial seas, or contiguous zones (when
declared) vessels that are reasonably suspected of carrying such cargoes to or from states
or non-state actors of proliferation concern and to seize such cargoes that are identified”;
and (2) “to enforce conditions on vessels entering or leaving their ports, internal waters or
territorial seas that are reasonably suspected of carrying such cargoes, such as requiring
that such vessels be subject to boarding, search, and seizure of such cargoes prior to
entry.”).
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territorial sea, which extends twelve nautical miles from a state’s coastal
territory, represents the greatest assertion of a state’s power.41 Second,
the contiguous sea, which extends for twelve nautical miles from the
territorial sea, is territory within which a state may enforce its laws.42
Third, the exclusive economic zone (“EEZ”), which extends 200 nautical
miles from a state’s coastal territory, grants a state limited jurisdiction to
conduct scientific research and to use and protect the marine
environment.43 Lastly, the high seas constitute an area over which no
state can exercise jurisdiction, absent a claim of universal sovereignty.44
A corollary to maritime jurisdiction is that a flag state has exclusive
jurisdiction over its vessel, meaning that a flagged vessel is akin to a
floating piece of a state’s territory.45 However, this principle is not
inviolable, because both international law and UNCLOS recognize that
sovereignty is not an end in itself and that some offenses require a breach
of sovereignty.46
To that end, under Article 110 of UNCLOS, a state has universal
jurisdiction over a flagged vessel if it is reasonably suspected of one of
the following actions: (1) sailing without a nationality, (2) engaging in
piracy, (3) trading in slaves, or (4) participating in unauthorized
broadcasting.47 These exceptions are essentially the only instances
where maritime law grants a nation the power to interdict another
nation’s ship on the high seas.48

41. John Astley III & Michael N. Schmitt, The Law of the Sea and Naval Operations,
42 A.F. L. REV. 119, 129 (1997) (explaining that states have the most rights in the area
closest to shore).
42. Jeremy Rabkin, How Many Lawyers Does It Take to Sink the U.S. Navy?, THE
WKLY. STANDARD, Sept. 10, 2007, http://www.weeklystandard.com/Content/Public/
Articles/000/000/014/052guyna.asp (explaining that in exchange for these benefits a state
consents to give other states “innocent passage” through its waters).
43. See United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea, art. 73, Dec. 10, 1982,
1833 U.N.T.S. 397 (stating that coastal states have the right to enforce their laws).
44. Williams, supra note 5, at 94 (noting that the seas are open to any vessel engaged
in a lawful purpose).
45. See Barry, supra note 9, at 305 (providing that freedom of navigation is the
“hallmark principle” of the law of the sea).
46. Becker, supra note 1, at 203-204 (explaining that certain offenses are so great that
they affect all nations and, therefore, give all nations a license to stop them).
47. Sandra L. Hodgkinson et al., Challenges to Maritime Interception Operations in
the War on Terror: Bridging the Gap, 22 AM. U. INT’L L. REV. 583, 591-92 (2007)
(explaining the limited exceptions to freedom of navigation).
48. Id. at 592 (noting the belligerent right of visit and search, not relevant for this
treatment, where if a warship in an armed conflict reasonably suspects a foreign-flagged
vessel of supplying weapons, then it may stop and search that vessel).
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B. The Preexisting Anti-Proliferation Framework
In order to explore the different regimes and enforcement
mechanisms for WMD, the following section examines nuclear,
chemical, and biological anti-proliferation efforts.
1. Nuclear Anti-Proliferation Efforts
After the United States detonated two atomic bombs over Hiroshima
and Nagasaki, states sought to control the awesome power of atomic
energy.49 The most notable effort, the NPT, was signed in 1968 to fight
nuclear proliferation and reduce Cold War tensions attendant to nuclear
weapons.50 The NPT delineated a framework through which states could
encourage peaceful nuclear development, manage the disarmament of
nuclear weapons, and thwart the proliferation of nuclear weapons and
their related technologies.51 Under the NPT, parties are forbidden from
transferring nuclear weapons or explosives to any state, and from
assisting or inducing any non-nuclear weapon state to manufacture or
acquire nuclear weapons or explosives.52 There are 189 signatory states
to the NPT.53
The NPT is enforced by the IAEA, which verifies compliance with
its safeguards and detects diversions of nuclear technology for nonpeaceful purposes.54 In theory, if the IAEA discovers that a state
violated the NPT then the matter is referred to the United Nations
Security Council, which may then decide to exercise its power under

49. Michael Elliott et al., Living Under the Cloud, TIME, Aug. 1, 2005 (stating that the
detonation of the bombs over Japan “forever serv[ed] as an admonishing reminder of
mankind's destructive capacities”).
50. Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT), UNITED NATIONS
OFFICE
FOR
DISARMAMENT
AFFAIRS,
http://www.un.org/disarmament/WMD/
Nuclear/NPT.shtml (last visited Jan. 19, 2014) (describing how the NPT was introduced
in 1968, came into force in 1970, and was extended indefinitely in 1995).
51. Joyner, supra note 6, at 512 (noting that alongside the development of the most
destructive weapons were regimes to limit their development and usage).
52. Allen, supra note 7, at 58 (pointing out that the global inventory of nuclear
weapons exceeds 10,000 despite sustained efforts to reduce it).
53. Id. at 59 (noting that the only states not party to the NPT are India, Israel,
Pakistan, and North Korea).
54. Taylor Burke, Nuclear Energy and Proliferation: Problems, Observations, and
Proposals, 12 B.U. J. SCI. & TECH. L. 1, 18-19 (2006) (noting that the IAEA’s goal is to
promote nuclear safety, security, science, and technology).
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Chapter VI or VII.55 However, occasionally one of the five permanent
members of the Security Council (the United States, United Kingdom,
France, China, or Russia) vetoes a Security Council resolution, leaving
the NPT unenforced and the violator unpunished.56
In 1975, in response to India’s detonation of a nuclear bomb, a group
of fifteen nations sought additional means to enforce the NPT through
the Nuclear Suppliers Group (“NSG”), a voluntary multilateral export
control regime.57 Because the test showed that nuclear technology used
for peaceful purposes could be used to create a weapon instead, NSG
supplier states sought to prevent such misuse by implementing
proliferation safeguards in their domestic laws.58 Although the NSG is
not formally part of the NPT, its members help enforce the NPT through
a set of guidelines and trigger list to control the export of nuclear
weapons and their component materials.59 If any item from the trigger
list is exported, then both the NSG and the NPT are implicated.60 The
list was expanded to include dual-use materials in 1992 after many
essential components of Iraq’s nuclear weapons program were
discovered to have originated through legitimate commerce.61
2. Chemical and Biological Anti-Proliferation Efforts
The Biological Weapons Convention (“BWC”), founded in 1972,
came out of existing efforts to ban biological weapons after their use in

55. Allen, supra note 7, at 58-60 (stating that although North Korea was party to the
NPT for many years, when it withdrew in 2003 the effect was mostly symbolic as it
flouted the treaty for years).
56. Harold Brown, New Nuclear Realities, WASH. Q., Winter 2007-2008, at 7, 12
(explaining that a state may remain in compliance with the NPT while developing nuclear
power until it reaches a stage when it can withdraw from the NPT and rapidly develop a
nuclear weapon, as was the case with North Korea).
57. Kate Heinzelman, Towards Common Interests and Responsibilities: The U.S.India Civil Nuclear Deal and the International Nonproliferation Regime, 33 YALE J.
INT’L L. 447, 454 (Summer 2008) (providing that India’s detonation led to the NSG and
an export control policy for nuclear materials).
58. See generally History of the NSG, NUCLEAR SUPPLIERS GROUP (NSG),
http://www.nuclearsuppliersgroup.org/ Leng/01-history.htm (last visited Jan. 19, 2014).
59. Becker, supra note 1, at 138-39 (explaining that the NSG supplements the NPT by
limiting exports to proliferators).
60. Allen, supra note 7, at 61-62 (explaining that a suspect export triggers the NPT
safeguards, which are set by the IAEA).
61. Joyner, supra note 6, at 516 (noting that legitimate commercial transactions of
dual-use materials were among the “greatest facilitator[s]” of the Iraqi nuclear weapons
program).
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World War I.62 The BWC’s goal is to stop the use, development,
production, and stockpiling of chemical and biological weapons through
their destruction.63 Unlike the NPT, it does not have a formal
enforcement mechanism, but relies on its signatories to recognize the
legally binding nature of the agreement.64
The Chemical Weapons Convention (“CWC”) is newer than the
BWC and NPT, but its mission is similar. Founded in 1993, the CWC
forbids its members from developing, producing, maintaining, or using
chemical weapons, and from permitting their use in any area under a
state’s control.65 Also like the BWC, the CWC does not have an
enforcement bureaucracy such as the IAEA, but it does employ
Although
international organizations to carry out its mission.66
violations of the CWC can ultimately be reported to the United Nations
Security Council, its enforcement mechanisms are mostly dependent
upon states implementing their own anti-chemical weapons legislation.67
The Australia Group has a similar relation to the BWC and CWC, as
the NSG has to the NPT.68 As with the NSG, the Australia Group is a
voluntary group of forty like-minded states that seek to stem proliferation
and do so by coordinating their laws and national export regimes.69
Founded in 1985 after the discovery that chemical weapons used in the
Iraq-Iran War partially originated through legitimate trade channels, the
62. Biological Weapons Convention, U.S. DEP’T OF STATE, http://www.state.gov/
t/isn/bw/ (last visited Jan 19, 2014).
63. Id. (noting that the convention strives, in part, to lessen the horrors of war).
64. Jack M. Beard, The Shortcomings of Indeterminacy in Arms Control Regimes: The
Case of the Biological Weapons Convention, 101 AM. J. INT’L. L. 271, 273-74 (2007)
(arguing that the use of hard, legal language and soft enforcement language leads to
problems in interpreting and enforcing the BWC)..
65. Allen, supra note 7, at 65 (explaining that the CWC originated in the 1925 Geneva
Gas and Bacteriological Warfare Protocol).
66. See Thomas D. Lehrman, Enhancing the Proliferation Security Initiative: The
Case for a Decentralized Nonproliferation Architecture, 45 VA. J. INT’L L. 223, 239
(explaining that centralizing anti-proliferation regimes within the United Nations helps
reduce costs and harmonize the international legal system)..
67. See Allen, supra note 7, at 65; see also About the CWC, U.S. CHEMICAL WEAPONS
CONVENTION, http://www.cwc.gov/CWC_about.html (last visited Jan. 19, 2014)
(explaining that in the United States, for instance, American companies “engaged in
activities involving these chemicals may be required to submit declarations and/or reports
to the Bureau of Industry and Security (“BIS”) and may be subject to inspection by the
Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons, which administers the CWC”).
68. Allen, supra note 7, at 68 (noting that the CWC requires its signatories to employ
export controls through its national laws).
69. Christopher A. Ford, The Nonproliferation Bestiary: A Typology and Analysis of
Nonproliferation Regimes, 39 N.Y.U. J. INT’L L. & POL. 937, 973 (2007).

200

OCEAN AND COASTAL LAW JOURNAL

[Vol. 19:2

Australia Group’s goal is to prevent legal proliferation by harmonizing
national export controls for chemical and biological weapon precursors.70
Its members meet regularly to ensure that member industries do not
export chemical and biological weapon precursors, or dual-use chemical
and biological weapon materials.71
C. The United Nations
Along with the general mandate from existing treaties and
frameworks, the PSI also derives authority from the United Nations72 In
particular, both the 1992 Presidential Statement and United Nations
Security Counsel Resolution 1540 are key authorities: the statement
declared that WMD proliferation is a global threat, and the resolution
mandated that all states must prevent WMD proliferation to terrorists.73
The resolution, which the Security Council unanimously passed on April
26, 2004, and reaffirmed with Resolution 1673 on April 27, 2006,
established three objectives.74 First, it affirmed and updated the NPT,
CWC, and BWC.75 Second, it required all United Nations members “to
punish any ‘non-[s]tate actors’ dealing in weapons of mass destruction
and technology.”76 Third, it required that all members institute effective
laws that “prohibit any non-State actor to manufacture, acquire, possess,
develop, transport, transfer or use nuclear, chemical or biological
weapons and their means of delivery, in particular for terrorist
purposes.”77

70. The Origins of the Australia Group, THE AUSTRALIA GROUP,
http://www.australiagroup.net/en/origins.html (last visited Jan. 19, 2014).
71. Id.
72. Becker, supra note 1, at 148-49 (explaining that the United States welcomes
United Nations support for the PSI even though the initiative is separate from the
international body).
73. Id.; see also Proliferation Security Initiative Fact Sheet: Statement of Interdiction
Principles, U.S. DEP’T OF STATE, http://www.state.gov/t/isn/c27726.htm (last visited Jan.
19, 2014) (stating that the PSI is “consistent” with the 1992 statement).
74. S.C. Res. 1673, ¶ 1 U.N. Doc. S/RES/1673 (Apr. 27, 2006) (reaffirming and reendorsing 1540).
75. S.C. Res. 1540, ¶ 1 U.N. Doc. S/RES/1540 (Apr. 28, 2004) (explaining that all
parties should fulfill their obligations within the existing framework)..
76. U.N. Security Council Unanimously Passes Resolution on WMD, U.S. DEP’T OF
STATE,
http://iipdigital.usembassy.gov/st/english/texttrans/2004/04/20040428173143
frllehctim0.7385828.html#axzz2t38o9fZO (last visited Jan. 19, 2014).
77. S.C. Res. 1540, ¶ 18 U.N. Doc. S/RES/1540 (Apr. 28, 2004) (explaining that this
must be done through export controls and other methods to prevent WMD acquisitions).
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In addition to its affirmations and requirements, 1540 universalized
the anti-proliferation system.78 Although the treaties detailed above are
only as strong as the states that are party to them, 1540 bound every
United Nations member to fight proliferation.79 Accordingly, by creating
a legally binding resolution in which all states are responsible for
implementing anti-proliferation laws, 1540 made the PSI more powerful
than it would be as a multilateral agreement.80
III. ANALYSIS
In October 2003, nearly a year after the North Korean incident, the
PSI had its most notable success when it interdicted a German-flagged
ship, the BBC China, on its way to Libya.81 As a result of international
cooperation between the United States, United Kingdom, Germany, and
Italy, the ship was diverted to an Italian port where thousands of parts of
uranium enrichment equipment were discovered in its hull.82 In contrast
to the So San incident, the BBC China interdiction was grounded in
international law and, more importantly for PSI advocates, the
interdiction seemed to vindicate its mission.83 By interdicting the ship,
the PSI proved its worth and effectiveness.84 Even more importantly,
because the interdiction happened in Italy’s territorial sea and the

78. Joyner, supra note 6, at 539 (arguing that 1540 improved the existing antiproliferation system by making it applicable to all states).
79. Id.
80. Id. (“Resolution 1540 addressed these challenges through the authority of the
Security Council under its Chapter VII power, binding upon every [United Nations
member] under Article 25 of the [United Nations] Charter. Through this legally binding
decision, the Security Council imposed additional continuing international legal
obligations on all [United Nations] member states.”); see also John Bolton, An All-Out
War on Proliferation, U.S. DEP’T OF STATE (Sept. 7, 2004), http://20012009.state.gov/t/us/rm/36035.htm (arguing that 1540 burdens all states with the legal
obligation to fight proliferation).
81. Becker, supra note 1, at 155.
82. Samuel E. Logan, The Proliferation Security Initiative: Navigating the Legal
Challenges, 14 FLA. ST. J. TRANSNAT’L L. & POL’Y 253, 274 (2005) (describing the BBC
China interdiction as the PSI’s most prominent achievement, because it showed that the
PSI could operate consistent with international law while simultaneously fighting
proliferation effectively).
83. Becker, supra note 1, at 156 (noting that shortly after the BBC China interdiction,
Libya renounced its weapons programs); see also Bolton, supra note 22, at 401 (arguing
that the interdiction also helped dismantle the A.Q. Khan black market nuclear
proliferation network).
84. See Byers, supra note 27, at 529.
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vessel’s flag state gave permission for its search, the interdiction was
legal.85
But suppose there was a different situation, in which a non-PSI state,
to circumvent international law, transferred a WMD to another non-PSI
state. Ostensibly, if the vessel stayed in friendly waters, flew a flag, and
was not reasonably suspected of a universal jurisdiction offense, it could
travel unmolested and deliver the WMD.86 Although the PSI sought to
close existing loopholes in the anti-proliferation system and the BBC
China was clearly a success, it is less clear that the PSI can stop this
hypothetical situation.87
To address such a situation, this section analyzes how well the PSI
closed such loopholes. First, it provides a side-by-side comparison
between the PSI and UNCLOS. Second, it measures how well the PSI
compares to the preexisting anti-proliferation regime. Third, it examines
the PSI’s effectiveness following the passage of United Nations Security
Council Resolution 1540.
A. The Law of the Sea Convention Provides Only a Limited Basis for
Universal Jurisdiction
In addressing UNCLOS’s limitations, the PSI makes some
improvements by committing nations to making proliferation a universal
jurisdiction offense.88 In particular, having over one hundred states
either to sign the PSI or support some kind of anti-proliferation effort is a
major accomplishment toward making WMD proliferation a universal
jurisdiction offense.89
Moreover, the significant amount of PSI
membership satisfies the first requirement of customary law—that the
custom is generally, if not universally, practiced.90 Accordingly, if more
85. Bolton, supra note 22, at 400 (attributing the PSI’s success, in part, to its “ample
authority to support interdiction actions at sea, in the air, and on land.”); see also Byers,
supra note 27, at 529 (noting that the legality of the BBC China interdiction was
undisputed).
86. See Byers, supra note 27, at 527.
87. See Becker, supra note 1, at 155 (explaining that the success of the BBC China
operation was due, in part, to not rocking the international law boat).
88. Hadley, supra note 24 (explaining that the PSI deputizes states to fight
proliferation by using their own resources and ingenuity).
89. See Proliferation Security Initiative 10th Anniversary High Level Political
DEP’T
OF
STATE
(May
28,
2013),
Meeting
Outcomes,
U.S.
www.state.gov/r/pa/prs/ps/2013/05/210010 (recognizing “the critical role the [PSI] has
played in countering the spread of [WMD]”).
90. See Barry, supra note 9, at 301 (defining customary international law as a
generally accepted state practice).
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states agree to interdict proliferators, then that practice may eventually
become generally accepted and, therefore, satisfy the second requirement
of international customary law.91
However, the great number of PSI participants can be misleading.92
Although strong membership is beneficial in theory, especially
considering that it constitutes over sixty percent of global, commercial
shipping tonnage, the problem remains that non-signatory states are the
ones most likely engaged in proliferation.93 Additionally, without
violating one of UNCLOS’s four exceptions under Article 110, a rogue
state can still proliferate to another with impunity.94 In this way, a state
can transport dual-use materials intended for WMD construction, even
though it is technically not breaking the law.95
In essence, UNCLOS’s interdiction power is significantly limited;
states do not have the legal authority to board a vessel suspected of
proliferation unless: (1) the vessel’s flag state gives permission to board,
or (2) the vessel is reasonably suspected of violating Article 110.96
Moreover, the flag states that are likely to proliferate are also unlikely to
permit other states to search their vessels, let alone to grant the power to
seize their cargo.97
Further, although UNCLOS already has the force of customary
international law, none of the four instances in which a state may breach
another state’s sovereignty is closely related to the interdictions
envisioned by the PSI.98 Instead, these exceptions reflect the widely
91. Id. at 302; but see Jack L. Goldsmith & Eric A. Posner, A Theory of Customary
International Law, 66 U. CHI. L. REV. 1113, 1114 (Fall 1999) (explaining that it is
unclear how a state practice becomes a custom because questions remain as to how many,
and how consistently, states must follow the practice).
92. Becker, supra note 1, at 164-65 (noting that China, India, Malaysia, and Indonesia
are not PSI members, which is problematic due to their influence in southeast Asia).
93. See Brown, supra note 56, at 7 (explaining how North Korea exploited the law to
“legally” develop a nuclear weapon); see also Proliferation Security Initiative Boarding
Agreement with Cyprus, U.S. DEP’T OF STATE (July 25, 2005), http://m.state.gov/
md50274.htm (noting that a large percentage of vessels may be subject to several
boarding, search, and seizure protocols).
94. Becker, supra note 1, at 203-204.
95. See Henry Sokolski, Nukes on the Loose, WKLY. STANDARD, June 23, 2003, at 20
(noting that Iran did not violate the NPT in most of its covert acquisitions).
96. See UNCLOS, arts. 95-96 (explaining that warships and vessels conducting
governmental, non-commercial services are immune from interdiction).
97. Byers, supra note 27, at 531. “The problem with all the treaty-based approaches is
that the states most likely to traffic in WMD and associated technologies are unlikely to
accord stop-and-search powers to other states.” Id.
98. Joyner, supra note 6, at 532 (arguing that efforts to expand the definition of piracy
to include WMD trafficking are unsuccessful due to their “total implausibility”).
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agreed-upon offenses during UNCLOS’s ratification.99 For example, the
BBC China operation, which stopped nuclear components from being
delivered to a state sponsor of terrorism, likely has more resonance post9/11 than in 1982, when UNCLOS was ratified.100 Accordingly, that
operation, which was completed pursuant to the PSI, would likely not
have been successful were it justified solely on Article 110.101 It follows,
by extension, that if terrorist operations were attempted on the high seas,
where such authorities’ power is more attenuated, then the likelihood of
success would be even smaller.102
A proponent of using UNCLOS to expand universal jurisdiction
might point to Article 110, which, in prefacing these exceptions, states
that they apply “[e]xcept where acts of interference derive from powers
conferred by treaty.”103 It stands to reason then, that the PSI, as an
extension of the anti-proliferation regime, is part of that conferred
power.104 However, being part of that power simply gives a state the
ability to rewrite its treaty obligations, rather than UNCLOS itself.105
Simply put, though the PSI is complementary of, and mindful of, the
place of UNCLOS, it cannot really be used to expand universal
jurisdiction.106 At best, the ways in which UNCLOS itself became
customary international law, through widespread adherence and the
99. Becker, supra note 1, at 204.
100. Tina Garmon, International Law of the Sea: Reconciling the Law of Piracy and
Terrorism in the Wake of September 11th, 27 TUL. MAR. L.J. 257, 258-59 (Winter 2002)
(explaining that some early drafts of UNCLOS defined “piracy” to include only
commerce, and not political acts, which might be defined as terrorism today).
101. Becker, supra note 1, at 204 (stating that “[u]nless proliferation actors engage in
piracy to facilitate the trafficking of dangerous materials, or if the trafficking somehow
involves manifestations of the modern slave trade (e.g., trafficking in sex workers), these
clear expressions of legal authority to override the non-interference principle on the high
seas will not have direct application”).
102. Tara Helfman, The Court of Vice Admiralty at Sierra Leone and the Abolition of
the West African Slave Trade, 115 YALE L.J. 1122, 1154 (Mar. 2006) (noting that
UNCLOS does not even prohibit non-contraband weapons).
103. UNCLOS, arts. 95-96 (delineating the circumstances in which a vessel has the
right of visit); see also Joyner, supra note 6, at 537 (explaining that “the drafters of
Article 110 wished to leave open the possibility that subsequent or already extant treaties
among groups of [UNCLOS] signatories might amend as among themselves the right of
interdiction covered in Article 110”).
104. Byers, supra note 27, at 527 (noting that a state can give another state permission
to exercise jurisdiction over its vessel).
105. Id. at 537 (noting that states can modify Article 110’s provisions simply by
creating “conflicting principles in other treaty instruments”).
106. Helfman, supra note 102, at 1154. UNCLOS is silent as to intercepting noncontraband weapons. Id.
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passage of time, can serve as a model for the PSI and the goal of
expanding universal jurisdiction.107
B. The Preexisting Anti-Proliferation Framework Inadequately
Addresses High Seas Proliferation
Before the PSI’s creation, the global anti-proliferation system had
mixed success.108 Although the system developed alongside WMD
technology, it did not always meet the challenge of anti-proliferation.109
Indeed, rather than taking a proactive role in preventing WMD
development, the system was more often reactive and responsive—
dealing with WMD after their use rather than before their creation.110
To some degree, this was understandable. Nations jealously guard
and heavily protect their defense secrets, particularly when weapons are
built in response to a real or perceived national security threat.111 In
addition, due to the complexities and suspicions associated with
international relations, an intrusive system faces many obstacles when it
tries to prevent a state from acquiring weapons that the state perceives as
necessary for its national security.112 Moreover, opposing parties are
deeply divided, distrustful, hostile, and share little common ground with
each other, such as the case of Iran and the U.S.-led negotiating
parties.113 In this context, stopping or even deterring proliferation is a
difficult and complicated pursuit.114
107. See generally, Barry, supra note 9, at 306-309 (explaining that the law of the sea
developed over a period of four centuries with the help of scholars, treaties, and state
practice).
108. Allen, supra note 7, at 57 (arguing that, for some critics, the preexisting antiproliferation regime has always been, and will remain, ineffective in stopping or deterring
the use of WMD by rogue states or terrorist groups).
109. Heinzelman, supra note 57, at 451 (explaining that in the context of nuclear
weapons, “proposals for an international nonproliferation system have vacillated between
emphasizing arms control and arms oversight”).
110. John R. Bolton, Conversations with the Forum: Perspectives on Preemption and
National Security: Interview with Under Secretary of State John R. Bolton, 29 FLETCHER
F. WORLD AFF. 5, 7 (Winter 2005) (arguing that the existing framework passively and
inadequately dealt with the precursors to WMD).
111. Joyner, supra note 6, at 525-26.
112. Id. at 512 (explaining that during the Cold War, the superpower rivalry between
the U.S. and Soviet Union spurred “almost unbridled development” of WMD programs).
113. Geoffrey Kemp, Desperate Times, Half Measures, THE NAT’L INTEREST (June 1,
2005), http://nationalinterest.org/article/desperate-times-half-measures-558.
114. When the Soft Talk Has to Stop, The ECONOMIST (Jan. 12, 2006),
http://www.economist.com/node/5382479 (noting that if a rogue state fully masters the
enrichment process, “the only bar to a military program[] is intent”).
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Despite these caveats, however, there is ample room for criticizing
the pre-PSI anti-proliferation system.115 In addition to the general bar
against the transfer and development of nuclear weapons, the NPT gives
its signatories the “inalienable right” to “develop research, produc[e] and
use [] nuclear energy for peaceful purposes.”116 In theory, because of the
significant number of states that are part of the NPT, which has been
ratified by more states than any other similar agreement, it should be an
effective tool of the anti-proliferation system.117 In practice, however, its
provisions have little effect, absent compliance.118
In particular, the NPT’s biggest loophole is that a state can act
entirely consistent with the NPT to develop a nuclear weapon by legally
obtaining most of the component parts necessary to build a weapon and
then opting out of the NPT when it is time to actually build the
weapon.119 In this way, a state can act “legally” as a party to the NPT to
develop a nuclear weapon and, thereafter, as a non-party to the NPT and
possess such a weapon.120 In addition, the NPT does not provide for the
universal interdiction of a state for nuclear weapon proliferation.121
115. Winner, supra note 2, at 130 (arguing the PSI responds to a new threat that cannot
be addressed just by the NPT); see also Amitai Etzioni, Enforcing Nuclear Disarmament,
THE NAT’L INTEREST (Dec. 1, 2004) http://nationalinterest.org/article/enforcing-nucleardisarmament-510.
116. Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, art. 4, July 1, 1968, 21
U.S.T. 483, 729 U.N.T.S. 161 [hereinafter NPT] (noting that the “peaceful purposes”
right is subject to compliance with the NPT’s requirement not to manufacture or transfer
a nuclear weapon).
117. Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT), UNITED NATIONS
OFFICE FOR DISARMAMENT AFFAIRS, http://www.un.org/disarmament/WMD/Nuclear/
NPT/index.shtml (last visited Feb. 4, 2014) (characterizing the amount of NPT
signatories as “a testament to the Treaty’s significance”); but see Brown, supra note 56,
at 18 (arguing that the failure to achieve nuclear disarmament since the NPT was ratified
has hindered anti-proliferation efforts); see also Wolfgang K. H. Panofsky, Nuclear
Insecurity, FOREIGN AFFAIRS (Sept. 2007) http://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/
62832/wolfgang-k-h-panofsky/nuclear-insecurity (noting that several NPT states are
trying to obtain nuclear weapons, and four nuclear weapons states (India, Israel, Pakistan,
and North Korea) are not parties to the treaty).
118. Becker, supra note 1, at 138; see also Elliott, supra note 49 (commenting that
none of the 1968 nuclear signatories intended to abide by their promise to completely
disarm their nuclear weapons).
119. Brown, supra note 56, at 12.
120. Becker, supra note 1, at 139; see also Joyner, supra note 6, at 517 (explaining the
difficulty of determining which technologies are dual-use where, for example, a civilian
space missile program is almost indistinguishable from a military missile program until it
is almost fully complete).
121. Adam Treiger, Plugging the Russian Brain Drain: Criminalizing NuclearExpertise Proliferation, 82 GEO. L.J. 237, 258 (1993).
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Indeed, under the NPT, proliferating nuclear material to a terrorist group
“is in effect legal.”122
The Chemical and Biological Weapons conventions share many of
the NPT’s limitations.123 The conventions, like the NPT, are only as
powerful as the number of states that are adhere to and willingly comply
with them.124 Although states adhere to the conventions in different
ways, their best chance of success is through informal groups, like the
Australia Group, which has produced “mixed” results.125
In contrast, the PSI helps guard against proliferation by raising its
costs and reducing the amount of states through which materials can be
inadvertently proliferated.126 Moreover, as the NPT essentially permits
proliferating nuclear material to a terrorist group, the PSI hinders such
proliferation by drying up the ways in which it can be proliferated.127
Although this prevention is limited to PSI states, it makes the ocean ways
less amenable to potential proliferators both by reducing the amount of
friendly parties who can assist such proliferation efforts, and by setting a
precedent, not only by law or agreement, but also by enforcement.128
In measuring the value of the anti-proliferation regimes, it is also
useful to compare the PSI to the NSG and Australia Group because they
each attempt to tackle the limitations of the preexisting system.129 The
PSI, similar to the NSG and Australia Group, complements the
preexisting system by creating a framework through which states can
voluntarily close loopholes in the regime.130 Additionally, unlike the
older anti-proliferation regimes, PSI participants do not have legally
binding responsibilities.131 This, in turn, facilitates the unilateral anti122. Etzioni, supra note 115.
123. Allen, supra note 7, at 66.
124. Nobuyasu Abe, Existing and Emerging Legal Approaches to Nuclear Weapons in
the 21st Century, 39 N.Y.U. J. INT’L L. & POL. 929, 931 (Summer 2007) (arguing that
“[t]he basic weakness of most methods based on joining like-minded countries together is
that participation and compliance are essentially voluntary”).
125. Becker, supra note 1, at 138.
126. Ford, supra note 69, at 589.
127. Etzioni, supra note 115.
128. Logan, supra note 82, at 256 (explaining that PSI states try to deter rogue states
and terrorist groups by making it more expensive to proliferate and requiring greater time
and effort to create a WMD).
129. See Gawdat Bahgat, Nonproliferation Success: The Libyan Model, WORLD
AFFAIRS, June 22, 2005, at 3, 5.
130. Allen, supra note 7, at 61.
131. Becker, supra note 1, at 149 (explaining that in the absence of formal legal
responsibilities, PSI member states frequently confer to trade information, strategize,
conduct training exercises, and coordinate and develop legal authorities).
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proliferation actions of states acting in their individual capacities or in
conjunction with each other.132 Thus, by harmonizing international
standards and encouraging individual state responsibilities toward
proliferation, the PSI, NSG, and Australia Group strengthen the NPT and
similar treaties by making it more difficult for a responsible state to
unwittingly export WMD components to a rogue state.133
However, there is one important difference. The NSG and Australia
Group focus on export controls, whereas the PSI focuses on actually
stopping proliferators.134 Although each makes proliferation more
difficult, only the PSI can physically stop proliferation.135 Accordingly,
because the other regimes basically consist of only information sharing,
the PSI adds a helpful element of force to what would otherwise be a set
of voluntary treaties supported only by voluntary export controls.136
As a result, voluntary enforcement agreements may appear to already
address the limitations of the preexisting regimes.137 However, the
problem is that the legal effect of the agreements is limited to signatory
states, which are already inclined not to develop or assist in the
development of WMD for rogue purposes.138 In this sense, it is similar

132. Id. at 151 (arguing that “while the PSI gives the impression of free-form
multilateralism through its decentralized operating structure, the ‘arrangement’ is more
accurately understood as a mechanism through which the unilateral actions of
participating states can be coordinated and facilitated”).
133. Walter Gary Sharp, Sr., Proliferation Security Initiative: The Legacy of Operacion
Socotora, 16 TRANSNAT’L L. & CONTEMP. PROBS. 991, 1013 (Spring 2007) (explaining
that such frameworks sometimes include a political obligation to prohibit or prevent
illegal activities under a state’s laws).
134. Bolton, supra note 22, at 400 (explaining that PSI activities are carried out by the
military, law enforcement, and intelligence agencies, whereas the NSG and Australia
Group are diplomatic efforts).
135. See Yoo & Sulmasy, supra note 8, at 410 (explaining that the interdiction process
may involve intelligence sharing, tracking a vessel, stopping it, and boarding it).
136. Logan, supra note 82, at 270 (noting that because the PSI involves preemption
action that such an action may be justified by how great a threat the WMD poses to the
interdicting state).
137. Abe, supra note 124, at 931 (noting that the NSG addresses some of the
weaknesses of the NPT by instituting export controls).
138. Sokolski, supra note 95, at 21 (noting that when the non-signatory state of North
Korea withdrew from the NPT, it was no longer illegal for it to export its nuclear
materials). Because of its withdrawal, North Korea could theoretically export a nuclear
weapon to another state without either state violating the NPT or international law. Id.
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to a group of law-abiding people who would never even commit a crime
in the first place agreeing not to commit or assist in a crime.139
In regard to the use of anti-proliferation resources for universal
interdiction, neither the PSI nor NPT’s text supports the deputizing of
any state to combat proliferation.140 Instead, such ideas are left to their
critics.141 For instance, Henry Sokolski, executive director of the
Nonproliferation Policy Education Center, proposes that WMD
proliferation should be a crime akin to piracy or slavery.142 He suggests
that “trade in weapons of mass destruction would make one an outlaw—
i.e., subject to the enforcing action of any law-abiding citizen.”143
However, absent such a proposal being instituted, the NPT, its sister
agreements, and the enforcement regimes provide little justification for
expanding universal jurisdiction.
In sum, the PSI’s relation to the existing anti-proliferation regime is
akin to an added tool.144 Although it is not a legal extension of the NPT
or CWC, it serves as a useful addition that can make proliferation harder.
145
It does so by, first, making it more difficult to supply a WMD or its
component parts to a rogue state and, second, by decreasing the amount
of states that will knowingly facilitate such a transfer.146 Taken by itself,
however, the PSI does not address the non-PSI country to non-PSI
country transfer hypothetical discussed above because such an

139. Etzioni, supra note 115 (analogizing that the “difference between the NPT
conception and that of deproliferation is akin to the difference between gun registration
and removal of guns from private hands and most public ones”).
140. NPT, supra note 116, 21 U.S.T. at 485-87 (the text explicitly gives the IAEA with
the power to deal with nuclear activities).
141. Sokolski, supra note 95, at 21 (proposing that “[a]ny nation’s attempt to redeploy
chemical, nuclear, or biological warheads outside of its borders or to ship the key means
to make them should be deprived the protection of international law”); see also Treiger,
supra note 121, at 257 (arguing that expanding the NPT to include the proposed universal
jurisdiction offense of proliferating nuclear expertise could be a useful deterrent).
142. Sokolski, supra note 95, at 21 (arguing that an international anti-proliferation
prohibition should be developed).
143. Id.
144. See Yoo & Sulmasy, supra note 8, at 407-10 (arguing that the PSI is an
improvement over the preexisting system).
145. See James Timbie, A Nuclear Iran: The Legal Implications of a Preemptive
National Security Strategy: Iran’s Nuclear Program, 57 SYRACUSE L. REV. 433, 441
(2007) (explaining that, in the case of Iran, the PSI makes it more difficult to procure
WMD materials).
146. See Press Release, President Barack Obama, supra note 7.
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interdiction would be a unilateral exercise of power and would not be an
act pursuant to the PSI’s text.147
C. The United Nations Takes Positive Steps to Address Proliferation
More than any other source, United Nations Security Council
Resolution 1540 (“1540”) expands universal jurisdiction.148 Unlike
UNCLOS, it explicitly prohibits all states from helping non-state actors
“develop, acquire, manufacture, possess, transport, transfer or use
nuclear, chemical or biological weapons and their means of delivery.”149
Also, unlike the preexisting anti-proliferation regimes, it has the force of
binding international law, which affects every state, rather than just the
voluntary signatory states.150 Further, it imposes binding obligations on
each state to legislate anti-proliferation controls for the purpose of
promoting universal adherence to existing international nonproliferation
treaties.151
In addition, by requiring that all states prevent proliferation, 1540
institutes a clear legal standard for the international system, one that goes
further in its implications than any voluntary agreement (like the PSI)
could do by itself.152 Indeed, its requirement that all states implement
national anti-proliferation laws is, in effect, a demand that states act
responsibly, and should they fail to do so, they may have to answer to the
United Nations Security Council.153 Echoing this, John Bolton, the
creator of the PSI,154 praised 1540 for “rest[ing] on the notion that

147. See NPT, supra note 116, 21 U.S.T. at 485-87 (showing that the NPT does not
address enforcement outside of the IAEA).
148. See Allen, supra note 7, at 73, 75-76 (arguing that 1540 is a crucial part of the
anti-proliferation regime because it imposes binding obligations on all states).
149. S.C. Res. 1540, supra note 75, ¶ 1 (noting that this applies under the United
Nation’s Chapter VII power).
150. Counter-Proliferation in Asia: No Place to Hide, Maybe, THE ECONOMIST, Oct.
30, 2004, at 43, 43 (noting that though signatories to the NPT, CWC, and BWC are
required to institute such laws, that they have not and that 1540 may be the impetus to
pass laws regulating “weapons materials and delivery systems”).
151. United Nations Security Council Resolution 1540 (2004), UNITED NATIONS,
http://www.un.org/sc/1540/ (last visited Feb. 9, 2014).
152. See Allen, supra note 7, at 76 (arguing that the message of 1540 is that all states
must do their part to fight proliferation).
153. See Byers, supra note 28 (explaining that the United Nations Security Council
reserved the power to act in itself).
154. Logan, supra note 83, at 265 (explaining that Bolton’s goal was for the PSI to
“shut down” proliferation).
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sovereign states are responsible for writing and implementing laws
closing the loopholes exploited by black market WMD networks.”155
However, though the State Department describes 1540 and the PSI as
consistent and reinforcing, there is debate about whether, if they are
compatible, the PSI is more far-reaching than 1540.156 For instance,
though all states are required to develop and maintain export controls, the
states are only called upon “[t]o promote the . . . strengthening of
multilateral treaties to which they are parties . . . .”157 This clause, by
being a recommendation, seems like it is only a reaffirmation of the
voluntary obligations of a signatory state to the NPT rather than a new
obligation to abide by the PSI or any other anti-proliferation
framework.158
In addition, the resolution is notable for what it does not sanction.
First, the president of the United Nations Security Council’s states that if
1540 were violated, then other states were not authorized to unilaterally
enforce it.159 Rather the United Nations Security Council as a whole
should answer any question about enforcement.160 Second, in drafting
the resolution, a provision that would have explicitly authorized PSIstyle activities was stricken in favor of a more general recommendation
that states work together in anti-proliferation efforts.161 Both examples
seem to narrow the resolution’s power and to only endorse the PSI
insofar as it operates within the multilateral, bureaucratic system that it
sought to avoid.162
155. Bolton, supra note 80.
156. See Proliferation Security Initiative Frequently Asked Questions, supra note 28
(explaining that both the PSI and 1540 seek to strengthen national laws regarding antiproliferation); see also Byers, supra note 27, at 532 (arguing that the “recommendatory
nature of [1540’s prevention] provision indicates, together with the references to
international law, an absence of any authorization to exceed the existing rules”).
157. Press Release, Security Council, Security Council Decides All States Shall Act to
Prevent Proliferation of Mass Destruction Weapons, U.N. Press Release SC/8076 (Apr. 8,
2004), available at http://www.un.org/News/Press/docs/2004/sc8076.doc.htm.
158. See Byers, supra note 27, at 532 (noting that parts of the resolution are limited in
what they require of states).
159. Allen, supra note 7, at 76 (noting that in matters of unilateral enforcement that
only the United Nations Security Council has the prerogative to act).
160. See id.
161. Becker, supra note 1, at 166-67 (describing the successful Chinese effort to
remove an explicit PSI-style authorization, possibly out of fear that such an authorization
could set an interdiction precedent that might disrupt China’s commercial shipping
interests in the future).
162. See Yoo & Sulmasy, supra note 8, at 409 (explaining that the United States
viewed the United Nations as unreliable and inadequate to deal with novel challenges,
which necessitated an organization that would act outside the United Nations).
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In some sense, this is probably an unavoidable situation. By
operating as a voluntary partnership, the PSI has the luxury of setting its
own rules and avoiding the legalisms of the international system.163 But
by its very nature, such a partnership can only have a universal impact if
the vast majority of states are party to it or if it is ratified by the United
Nations.164 Accordingly, in the matter of whether a state can interdict a
vessel on the high seas that it reasonably suspects of transporting WMD,
for now it seems that it is a choice of whether to act unilaterally and
outside the international system or 1540.165 In such a case, John Bolton
suggests:
Where there are gaps or ambiguities in our authorities, we may
consider seeking additional sources for such authority, as
circumstances dictate. What we do not believe, however, is that
only the Security Council can grant the authority we need, and
that may be the real source of the criticism we face.166
Given the uncertainty of WMD interdiction, such ambiguity is
especially unfortunate.167 After all, perhaps the most important reason
why proliferation is such a challenging issue is the fact that about 95
percent of WMD components are dual-use materials, meaning that they
themselves can be subject to interpretation.168 Therefore, when one state
is trying to determine whether to interdict a vessel from another state, it
must make two decisions: (1) whether its information is good enough to
reasonably suspect that the target materials are illegal and (2) whether it
should bear the risk of running afoul of international law if the vessel’s
163. See Becker, supra note 1, at 165-67 (arguing that the PSI is essentially a system
that facilitates unilateral enforcement actions).
164. Id. at 155 (contrasting adherence to treaties and United Nations resolutions).
165. Id.
166. John R. Bolton, “Legitimacy” in International Affairs: The American Perspective
in Theory and Operation, U.S. DEP’T OF STATE (Nov. 13, 2013), http://www.
state.gov/t/us/rm/26143.htm; see also Christopher Kremmer, High Stakes on the High
Seas in Korean Blockade, SYDNEY MORNING HERALD (July 12, 2003),
http://www.smh.com.au/cgi-bin/common/popupPrintArticle.pl?path=/articles/2003/07/
11/1057783354653.html (citing John Bolton as having argued that self-defense is
sufficient to justify a high-seas interdiction).
167. See supra Part II.C (noting that Iran and Iraq acquired many parts to build WMD
by procuring dual-use items through the exploitation of legitimate trade channels).
168. See Logan, supra 82, at 259. “The effort to interdict the rare illicit shipment may
require the coastal state to stop and search numerous ships which turn out to pose no
threat at all. And further, even if questionable materials are found, the coastal state must
then prove that the materials will be used for threatening rather than non-threatening
purposes.” Id.
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contents are perfectly legal.169 Accordingly, the fact that 1540 is limited
in its scope and that a vessel’s contents may be subject to interpretation
create a situation in which the only thing that a vessel proliferating
WMD on the high seas has to fear is a hostile state that makes the bold,
risky, and illegal move of unilaterally interdicting it.170 In sum, while
1540 makes definite strides toward universalizing anti-proliferation
efforts, it falls short of fully addressing proliferation on the high seas.171
IV. RECOMMENDATIONS
It should by now be clear that the PSI suffers from two limitations.
First, despite its many signatories, a determined rogue state or group can
flout its strictures by simply being a non-PSI member that complies with
international law.172 Second, without the support of more nations, it will
be difficult, if not impossible, to establish WMD interdiction either as a
core principle of customary international law or of United Nationsbacked international law.173 Without addressing these limitations, the
PSI will simply be another anti-proliferation tool rather than an initiative
that closes the loopholes of the anti-proliferation system. The following
are three recommendations aimed at fixing the PSI’s limitations.
A. Universal Jurisdiction Should Be Expanded
Through the United Nations
Despite its occasional aversion to international law, the United States
often looks to international law to justify its actions, solve its problems,
or maintain its security.174 For instance, in the run-up to the Iraq war, the
169. See id. (explaining that the interdictor would have to show that the United Nations
makes transporting WMD illegal and that the transport is itself a danger); see also
Becker, supra note 1, at 149 (noting that dual-use materials must be clearly described to
prevent legitimate materials from being seized).
170. See infra Part IV.C (discussing preemptive attacks).
171. See Becker, supra note 1, at 167 (stating that “it is not clear that the PSI has
effectively created a global consensus on acceptable standards and procedures for
counter-proliferation interdiction operations at sea”).
172. Id. at 155 (explaining that anti-proliferation efforts are only as powerful as the
states that comply with them).
173. See Allen, supra note 7, 58-62 (discussing the limitations of non-universal
compliance with the PSI).
174. See William H. Taft, IV, A View From the Top: American Perspectives on
International Law After the Cold War, 31 YALE J. INT’L L. 503, 503-04 (2006) (arguing
that since the end of the Second World War, the United States employed international
law to its benefit in military alliances, trade, science, environment, and human rights).
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Bush administration made its case at the United Nations.175 There, the
United States argued that because Iraq had violated United Nations
Security Council Resolutions, the United Nations or, failing that, a
member state, had to take action to enforce the resolutions.176 Similarly,
even though it is not party to UNCLOS, the United States benefits from
customary international law because international law ensures the
legality of both the mobility of the United States’ armed forces and the
merchant vessels that travel to and from the country’s shores.177
To some, by going to the United Nations Security Council and
obtaining a new resolution, a state would, on the one hand, benefit from a
universal law but could, on the other hand, be hindered by another state’s
veto.178 In this sense, going to the United Nations might be an
anachronistic gesture more appropriate to the Cold War.179 Such
criticism may be misplaced.
Going to the United Nations to expand universal jurisdiction is a
natural extension of past efforts to strengthen and act in accord with the
international system.180 The problem with United Nations Security
Council Resolution 1540, as detailed above, is that, though it mandates
that states close loopholes to proliferation, it does not give express
authorization to high seas interdictions.181 A new United Nations
resolution (or amendment to 1540) that explicitly backs the PSI and
delineates specific circumstances in which a state can interdict another

175. See Winston P. Nagan and Craig Hammer, The New Bush National Security
Doctrine and the Rule of Law, 22 BERKELEY J. INT’L L. 375, 404-05 (2004).
176. See David B. Rivkin, Jr., The Virtues of Preemptive Deterrence, 29 HARV. J.L. &
PUB. POL’Y 85, 100-02 & n. 36 (Fall 2005) (arguing that “aside from the legality of
preemption, the Iraq war was perhaps the most legally justified war of all time”); but see
Nagan and Hammer, supra note 175, at 413-17 (arguing that the Bush administration’s
reliance on United Nations Security Council resolutions owed more to tendentious
interpretations of the text as opposed to a solid legal basis for the use of force).
177. See Byers, supra note 27, at 527 (explaining that the United States’ decision to
release the So San demonstrated the seriousness with which it regards UNCLOS).
178. See Yoo & Sulmasy, supra note 8, at 409-10 (arguing that the United States
created the PSI, in part, because the Security Council was unreliable and would possibly
veto the initiative).
179. Id. (arguing that, in the past, the United Nations was unfit to deal with new
challenges to international order).
180. Taft, supra note 174, at 505 (noting that the United States “enthusiastically
supported the development of new international legal obligations” in the Security
Council).
181. Becker, supra note 1, at 167 (explaining that China’s successful effort to prevent
PSI-style interdictions from being expressly authorized frustrated the development of
customary international law to include such interdictions).
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state’s vessel would improve 1540 by closing the high seas gap.182 In
addition, unlike other methods of creating international law, such as
through treaties or the development of international norms, it would
quickly institute what would otherwise take years to put in place.183 For
these reasons, a United Nations resolution may be the best way to
quickly and effectively expand universal jurisdiction.
B. Universal Jurisdiction Should Be Expanded By
Increased PSI Membership
As shown by the obstacles to getting an explicit authorization from
the United Nations for PSI-style interdictions, it may be more realistic to
expand universal jurisdiction through increasing membership in the PSI
and thereby developing customary international law.184 Although it will
not initially bear the imprimatur and authority of international law, the
practice of interdiction combined with increasing the number of PSI
members will strengthen anti-proliferation efforts by decreasing the
amount of states that tacitly permit proliferators to travel the seas
unmolested and by increasing the costs of transporting WMD.185
History provides at least one analogous example for this type of
action. In the early 19th century, the British started suppressing the
transatlantic slave trade through a campaign that employed both
diplomacy and unilateral action.186 At first, the efforts consisted of
unilateral boarding and bilateral interdiction treaties between Britain and
182. Id. (noting that a new right of interdiction is unlikely to develop out of customary
international law without a Security Council authorization).
183. Id. (explaining that developing international customary law is made even more
difficult when based off of treaties due to the exceptions that states incorporate into
treaties as a condition for signing them).
184. See Barry, supra note 9, at 330. “Like the crimes of piracy and slavery, the near
universal condemnation of the transfer of WMD, as evidenced by specific multilateral
treaties, could indicate that a new principle of jus cogens is being formulated, creating a
universal jurisdiction over the act.” Id.
185. See Sharp, supra note 133, at 1026 (proposing that PSI states announce the state
and non-state actors with which they are concerned, which could make proliferation more
difficult by increasing its costs and reducing the number of otherwise friendly states); see
also Goldsmith & Posner, supra note 91, at 1119 (explaining that customary international
law develops over time due to changes in power, technology, and other factors, as when
coastal jurisdiction increased from the three-mile cannon-shot rule to the present twelvemile rule).
186. See Byers, supra note 27, at 534-36 (arguing that moral and economic reasons
explain how Britain went from being a player in the slave trade to the primary proponent
of abolition).
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other states.187 As the campaign went on, multilateral treaties and an
enforcement regime supplemented the earlier strategies.188 Through
these efforts, by the end of the 19th century, Britain, along with other
states, formed a “near universal” consensus against the slave trade.189
As with the British and the slave trade, there already exists a
consensus of sorts against proliferating WMD in the form of the various
anti-proliferation efforts.190 Perhaps by extension, the wrong that is
thwarted by searching a ship of one hundred slaves can also justify
searching a vessel that contains either a weapon or parts of a weapon that
can kill thousands.191 Accordingly, should universal jurisdiction not be
expanded through the United Nations, building upon the existing
consensus against proliferation and increasing membership in the PSI
may be the next best option.
C. Universal Jurisdiction Should Be Expanded Unilaterally
With all this in mind, some states may not want to take the risk of
operating through the international system and may instead decide to act
unilaterally.192 Under these circumstances, if a state feels threatened by a
vessel that it reasonably suspects of carrying WMD, it may conclude that
it should unilaterally interdict a vessel regardless of the condemnations
and criticisms which may accompany such an act.193 In a sense, it is
breaking one law in order to prevent another law from being broken.

187. Barry, supra note 9, at 315 (explaining that Britain’s initial unilateral actions set
in motion the abolition of transatlantic slavery).
188. Becker, supra note 1, at 208 (explaining that the British used multiple tactics
toward the goal of abolishing slavery).
189. Barry, supra note 9, at 315 (explaining that the customary international law
against slavery came about because Britain was the only nation that had the capability
and will to unilaterally prohibit it).
190. Becker, supra note 1, at 167 (showing that the goal of nonproliferation is widely
shared, if not the means to achieve the goal); see also Barry, supra note 9, at 330 (arguing
that due to the widespread condemnation of proliferation, it follows that there may
already be authority to justify stopping proliferation on the high seas).
191. See Helfman, supra note 102, at 1153 (explaining that one prominent slavery
abolitionist, using similar logic, argued that slave traders were equivalent to pirates,
which therefore gave the British a license to stop the trade); see also Langewiesche,
supra note 3 (describing the impact of a nuclear bomb).
192. See Becker, supra note 1, at 229 (conceding that “if the United States and its PSI
allies suspect that a vessel is transporting a WMD shipment at sea, they are going to
act”).
193. Id. at 230 (arguing that non-interference in foreign affairs can be a good tool for
promoting peace and security, but that it is not an end in itself).
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Although this might do short-term damage to the authority of
international law, it will also illustrate how serious states are about
ending proliferation, even if it means acting extralegally.194 More
importantly, it will show that anti-proliferation regimes are not just dead
letters. Such a showing could, in turn, lead to the practice of interdicting
proliferating vessels becoming customary international law.195
V. CONCLUSION
Even though the PSI is a useful tool in deterring and stopping the
proliferation of WMD, it does not do enough to address proliferation on
the high seas. Due to the voluntary nature of the PSI, its shortcomings
are a reflection of factors that are out of its control. One such factor is
the unwillingness of other states to use the United Nations to form a
more aggressive anti-proliferation framework. Therefore, in response to
the current limitations of international law in combating WMD
proliferation, states should expand the doctrine of universal jurisdiction
to include WMD interdiction through the United Nations, by increasing
membership in the PSI, or by unilateral action. Such an expansion will
make the world a safer place by increasing the costs of proliferation and
emphasizing the seriousness with which responsible states regard WMD
proliferation.

194. See Barry, supra note 9, at 322-23 (explaining that Israel’s preemptive attacks
against hostile Arab states in the Six Day War and Iraq’s nuclear program bolstered the
case for anticipatory self-defense by proportionately attacking an imminent threat); see
also Becker, supra note 1, at 209 (noting that even after an adverse court ruling, the
British continued to interdict slave vessels and regard slave trading as a universal
offense).
195. But see Becker, supra note 1, at 229-30 (arguing that even though a state may be
justified in acting unilaterally, the costs of such action will be more easily borne if done
with the blessing of the international community).

